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OPIOID CASES AND STATE MDLS
Zachary Clopton & D. Theodore Rave1

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the opioid litigation, as in so many other instances, the federal
courts seem to get all the attention. Even as scholars such as Professor
Judith Resnik have shone a light on the importance of state courts,
they continue to lack support.2 State courts handle many more cases
than federal courts, and they often do so on shoestring budgets. Some
have called this a “crisis.”3
While there may be a crisis in state courts for many litigants and
many cases, this diagnosis is not universally true. For one thing, some
states have developed specialized business courts, seemingly to attract
high-end litigation or to serve the needs of powerful interests in the
state.4 In addition to this “wine track” for high-value cases, we have
identified a pattern of states developing specialized bodies or rules to
handle mass litigation that may or may not involve “business cases.”5
1. Professor of Law, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law; Professor of Law, University of
Texas School of Law. Thanks to Emily Berman, Pamela Bookman, Elizabeth Burch, Erin Delaney, David Fagundes, Maggie Gardner, Maria Glover, Abbe Gluck, Lonny Hoffman, David
Kwok, Alexandra Lahav, Stephan Landsman, James Nelson, David Noll, Judith Resnik, Joe
Sanders, Irene Ten Cate, Alan Trammell, Kellen Zale, and Adam Zimmerman for helpful
comments.
2. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Revising Our “Common Intellectual Heritage”: Federal and State
Courts in Our Federal System, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1831, 1926–27 (2016). Professor Resnik
has, at times, relied on the amount of actual light shone to shine a light on the courts. See, e.g.,
Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1126 (2006)
(“[C]ongressional investigations (prompted by requests for funding of courthouse construction)
report that federal courtrooms have their ‘lights on’—meaning lit for at least two hours a day—
about half of the time.”).
3. See, e.g., Peter T. Grossi, Jr. et al., Crisis in the Courts: Reconnaissance and Recommendations, in FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 83–85 (2012), available at http://www.ncdsv.org/
images/NCSC_FutureTrendsInStateCourts_2012.pdf.
4. See, e.g., John F. Coyle, Business Courts and Interstate Competition, 53 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1915, 1918–19 (2012) (collecting examples).
5. Although high-profile mass torts such as the opioid litigation are also highly resourced litigation, the state MDLs we study are seemingly agnostic to the monetary value of the cases they
consolidate. See generally Zachary D. Clopton & D. Theodore Rave, MDL in the States, 115 NW.
U. L. REV. 1649 (2021). Indeed, California rejected a proposal to create a “business court” in
favor of pursuing a transsubstantive state MDL procedure. Id. Note, too, that while a few highprofile federal MDLs garner most of the attention, federal MDL also has been a mechanism for
consolidating smaller numbers of much lower resourced cases. See Zachary D. Clopton, MDL as
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We have called these procedures to consolidate state-court litigation
“state MDLs.”6
Like federal multidistrict litigation (MDL), state MDLs coordinate
litigation across courts within a court system. Sometimes, state MDLs
handle mass intrastate disputes (e.g., insurance lawsuits in Texas following a hurricane, wage-and-hour cases against employers in California).7 But sometimes, a state invokes its MDL procedures to
coordinate state-court litigation in parallel with a federal MDL and
other state MDLs—including in the ongoing opioid litigation.8
In this Article, we use the opioid litigation to consider the role of
state MDLs in resolving national controversies proceeding in both
state and federal courts. Of course, the opioid litigation is special for
countless reasons, many of which are detailed elsewhere in this volume. But we think that the presence of overlapping federal and state
MDLs is likely to be a persistent feature of mass tort litigation more
generally, and there is value in uncovering how state MDLs work in
perhaps the highest profile mass tort litigation of the day.
Our first contribution is descriptive. In this Article, we undertake a
detailed study of opioid cases consolidated in state MDLs. We identify
the state MDLs that have consolidated hundreds of opioid cases, describe their creation and development, and present detailed information on the parties and lawyers involved. The state MDLs vary
considerably along a number of dimensions. In some states, the judge
handling the state MDL is handpicked by a special panel or by the
state’s highest court; in other states, the judge in the first case filed can
consolidate all subsequent related cases in his or her own court. In
some states, the lead plaintiffs’ lawyers from the federal MDL appear
to have considerable sway in the parallel state MDLs; in other states,
lawyers who have no apparent role in the federal leadership have
been appointed to lead the state MDLs. And so, with effective control
over all of the opioid cases pending in a given state’s courts, state
MDL judges and lawyers can form power centers independent from—
and potentially antagonistic to—the federal MDL.
Our second contribution is more theoretical. We use the opioid litigation to explore what it means to have alternative power centers in
Category, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1297, 1316–23 (2020) (describing the range of MDLs and collecting examples of low-profile cases).
6. See Clopton & Rave, supra note 5, at 1657.
7. See id. at 1676–93 (surveying case types in California and Texas’s state MDL systems); see
also D. Theodore Rave & Zachary D. Clopton, Texas MDL, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 367,
368 (2020).
8. See Clopton & Rave, supra note 5, at 1714–18.
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state courts when nationwide litigation is consolidated in a federal
MDL. Because of the rules of federal subject-matter jurisdiction (and
the preferences of parties and attorneys), mass tort disputes in the
United States typically will be centered around a federal MDL, exerting a gravitational pull on satellite cases in state courts. But the consolidation of those satellite cases into state MDLs creates
opportunities for smaller yet meaningful counterweights to form and
exert their own (weaker) gravitational pull on the federal MDL and
on each other. State MDLs derive their potency both from the fact
that they proceed in separate court systems and from the fact that
they represent the consolidation of multiple state lawsuits. That potency limits the power of federal MDL judges and lawyers, and in so
doing potentially reduces some of the agency costs that critics worry
plague the plaintiffs’ side in these disputes. Of course, this reduction
in agency costs also comes with an increase in collective action
problems on the plaintiffs’ side, as the ability to pool resources and
bargain collectively with defendants is cut down.
We do not in this Article offer a full-throated endorsement or critique of state MDLs in general or in the opioid litigation in specific.
Instead, we argue that the ability to consolidate state cases into state
MDLs substantially changes the mass tort litigation environment—in
ways that matter for parties, courts, and public policy. The opioid litigation is not necessarily better or worse for the presence of state
MDLs. But it is different.
II. THE STATE

OF

OPIOID LITIGATION

IN

STATE MDLS

A. State MDLs in General
Starting only four years after adoption of the federal Multidistrict
Litigation Act of 1968,9 states began to adopt their own procedures to
coordinate related litigation across courts within the state.10 In other
work, we refer to these procedures as “state MDLs.”11 We define state
MDLs as “special mechanisms that depart from the ordinary venue or
venue-transfer rules to allow for consolidation or coordination of
cases across different courts within a single state.”12 This definition
excludes subject-specific procedures, rules to consolidate cases pend9. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1968); see generally Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 831 (2017).
10. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 404–04.9 (West 2021); 1972 Cal. Stat. 2286, 2287 (creating California’s Civil Case Coordination Proceeding, effective January 1, 1974).
11. Clopton & Rave, supra note 5, at 1657. The following description draws heavily on this
other work.
12. Id.
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ing within a single court, and the usual provisions for venue transfer
within a court system.13
Our earlier study taxonomized state MDLs into four rough categories based on how cases are consolidated: (1) “institutional MDL,” (2)
“peer MDL,” (3) “ad hoc MDL,” and (4) no mechanism for MDL-like
consolidation.14 This taxonomy is reflected in Table 1 below.
TABLE 1: STATE MDL TAXONOMY
Institutional MDL
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Illinois
Kansas
Minnesota
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Oregon
Texas
Virginia
West Virginia

Peer MDL
Indiana
Maine
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Wisconsin

Ad Hoc MDL
Michigan
Oklahoma
South Carolina
Tennessee

No MDL analogy
Alabama Mississippi
Alaska
Missouri
Arizona
Montana
Arkansas Nebraska
Delaware Nevada
Florida
New Mexico
Georgia
North Dakota
Hawaii
Ohio
Idaho
South Dakota
Iowa
Utah
Kentucky Vermont
Louisiana Washington
Maryland Wyoming

The “institutional MDL” states have formal procedures that rely on
an institution or actor outside of the trial court to make decisions
about consolidation and assignment of related cases.15 Colorado, New
York, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia rely on a specialized MDL
panel to consolidate cases.16 Illinois, Kansas, New Jersey, and Oregon
rely on the state’s highest court to decide whether to consolidate
cases.17 California, Minnesota, and North Carolina authorize the chief
justice of the state’s highest court to decide whether and where to
13. Cf. 231 PA. CODE § 1041.1 (2020) (outlining procedures governing asbestos cases); FED. R.
CIV. P. 42 (permitting consolidation of related actions within a court); 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1948)
(governing venue transfer).
14. See Clopton & Rave, supra note 5, at 1657–59. The following table is drawn from that
source as well. See id. at 1658.
15. Id. at 1659–60.
16. See id. at 1664. Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia’s panels also decide on which judge will
handle the consolidated cases. In New York, the administrative judge of the selected court
makes the assignment. Id. (collecting sources). And in Colorado, the Chief Justice makes the
assignment. Id. (collecting sources).
17. Id. at 1666 (collecting sources). Kansas, Illinois, and New Jersey’s high courts also select
the transferee judge. In Oregon, the chief justice alone makes the assignment. Id. (collecting
sources).
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consolidate cases, with California’s procedure formally providing for
input from other judicial actors.18 Finally, Connecticut has a hybrid
system that allows the chief court administrator to make decisions
about consolidation along with allowing trial judges to consolidate
cases themselves.19
In the “peer MDL” states, trial judges with pending cases get to
decide whether to consolidate cases pending in front of other trial
judges in the state.20 Indiana, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania allow
the judge in the earliest-filed action to order other cases filed around
the state to be consolidated.21 Maine and Rhode Island extend this
authority to any judge with pending cases, and New Hampshire extends it to any judge receiving a motion.22 Finally, in Wisconsin, the
transferee and transferor judges must issue a joint order for
consolidation.23
We also identified four states that have a history of “ad hoc” consolidation. Michigan, Oklahoma, and South Carolina have at times consolidated cases by Supreme Court order without relying on any
specific rule or statute.24 Tennessee essentially allows each of its districts to adopt its own system. The state’s most populous county
(Shelby County) has taken advantage of this option by providing in a
local rule that all judges of the court may sit together to decide
whether consolidation is appropriate.25
As it turns out, all three types of state MDL systems were employed
in the opioid litigation.
B. Opioid Litigation in State Courts
The most visible aspects of the opioid litigation have been in federal
court, but court watchers know that not all opioid cases are consolidated in the federal MDL in front of Judge Dan Aaron Polster.26 Indeed, the first trial in the opioid litigation was held in state court in
18. Id. at 1666–67 (collecting sources).
19. Id. at 1667 (collecting sources).
20. Id. at 1660.
21. Id. at 1667 (collecting sources).
22. Id. at 1667–68 (collecting sources).
23. Id. at 1668 (collecting sources).
24. Id. at 1660–62 (collecting sources).
25. Id. at 1661 (collecting sources); see Tenn. 30th J. Dist. Ct. R. 28.
26. See, e.g., Jan Hoffman, Can This Judge Solve the Opioid Crisis?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/health/opioid-crisis-judge-lawsuits.html (describing
Judge Polster’s role).
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Oklahoma.27 And, an important trial to be held in New York state
court was delayed due to COVID-19.28 But the structure of these state
proceedings is less well known. As we explain below, much of the
state opioid litigation has found its way into state MDLs.
Our investigation began with state opioid cases generally. In the
face of thousands of lawsuits, Purdue Pharma, one of the primary
opioid defendants, filed for bankruptcy and, as part of that process,
asked the bankruptcy court to stay a list of cases pending across the
country.29 We reviewed this list and extracted all of the cases pending
in state courts. Doing so revealed 430 cases in state courts (and two in
state administrative proceedings) as of September 2019. There are, of
course, substantially more “opioid cases” in state courts not captured
by this method, but this rough cut was sufficient to give us an approximate sense of the scale of state court opioid litigation and begin to
identify cases consolidated into state MDLs.30 Because we know
where to look for state MDLs, we are more confident that we have
captured the universe of opioid cases in state MDLs.
Looking more closely at the state cases identified in the bankruptcy
filings, we found that there were opioid cases pending in forty-eight
states.31 New York led the way with fifty-eight state opioid cases. Ten
states had ten or more pending cases, accounting for eighty percent of
the state cases. At the other end of the spectrum, there were two or
fewer cases in 30 states (including the two states with none). Full results are reflected in Table 2 below.

27. See Jan Hoffman, Johnson & Johnson Ordered to Pay $572 Million in Landmark Opioid
Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/26/health/oklahomaopioids-johnson-and-johnson.html.
28. See Press Release, NY Attorney Gen. Letitia James, Out Of Abundance Of Caution,
Opioid Trial Delayed Due To Coronavirus (Mar. 10, 2020), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2020/
out-abundance-caution-opioid-trial-delayed-due-coronavirus.
29. See Complaint, Exhibits A–C, In re Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 19-23649 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 18, 2019) [hereinafter “Bankruptcy Exhibits”].
30. For example, this method does not capture cases initiated after Purdue filed its exhibits in
the bankruptcy proceeding or completed before the filing, nor can we be sure that Purdue listed
all cases that one would consider “opioid litigation.” For some early examples of opioid cases,
see Nora Freeman Engstrom & Robert L. Rabin, Pursuing Public Health Through Litigation, 73
STAN. L. REV. 285 (2021).
31. The only states whose courts did not appear among the bankruptcy exhibits were Michigan and Nebraska. Since those documents were filed, the state of Michigan filed a lawsuit in
state court. See Michigan v. Cardinal Health, Inc., No. 19-016896 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Dec. 17, 2019).
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TABLE 2: PURDUE CASES
New York - 58
Pennsylvania - 53
West Virginia - 50
Texas - 48
South Carolina - 42
Illinois - 30
Oklahoma - 25
Massachusetts - 15
Utah - 13
Connecticut - 10
Arizona - 9
New Jersey - 7
Nevada - 5
Tennessee - 5
Virginia - 5
California - 4

BY

STATE

AS OF

Alabama - 3
Delaware - 3
Missouri - 3
Ohio - 3
Arkansas - 2
Hawaii - 2
Indiana - 2
Maryland - 2
Mississippi - 2
New Hampshire - 2
New Mexico - 2
North Carolina - 2
Oregon - 2
Rhode Island - 2
Vermont - 2
Alaska - 1

15:54
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SEPTEMBER 2019
Colorado - 1
Florida - 1
Georgia - 1
Idaho - 1
Iowa - 1
Kansas - 1
Kentucky - 1
Louisiana - 1
Maine - 1
Minnesota - 1
Montana - 1
North Dakota - 1
South Dakota - 1
Washington - 1
Wisconsin - 1
Wyoming - 1

The opioid cases in state court are primarily cases filed by municipalities, along with some actions filed by state attorneys general and
some private actions.32 Though we cannot say so definitively, it appears that many state-court plaintiffs could have pleaded cases plausibly within federal subject-matter jurisdiction, 33 so we think it is fair to
say that most of these plaintiffs had a preference for state court. We
also note that many of the municipality plaintiffs in state courts (and
in state MDLs) have opted out of the federal negotiation class.34
Defendants, on the other hand, frequently tried to escape state
court using (sometimes artful) removal.35 The cases that remain in
32. See Bankruptcy Exhibits, supra note 29.
33. For example, for purposes of diversity of citizenship, any corporate defendant is a citizen
of its state of incorporation and principal place of business, meaning that plaintiffs in at least 48
states would have been able to sue that defendant in federal court for claims exceeding $75,000.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), (c) (1948).
34. Compare Bankruptcy Exhibits, supra note 29, with Request for Entry of Proposed Rule
23(c)(1)(B) Negotiation Class Membership Order, Exhibit C (“NPO Opt Out Report - Timely
Opt Outs”), In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Jan. 10,
2020) [hereinafter “Request for Negotiation Class”].
35. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 327 F. Supp. 3d 1064 (N.D. Ohio 2018)
(permitting defendant McKesson Corporation to rely on federal officer removal statute by applying Sixth Circuit’s broad interpretation of that statute); In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig.,
No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Aug. 23, 2018) (finding no federal subject-matter jurisdic-
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state court are a mix of removed-and-remanded cases for which federal jurisdiction did not attach,36 cases in which not all defendants
consented to removal (and in which the Class Action Fairness Act did
not permit nonunanimous removal),37 and cases that defendants did
not attempt to remove.38
Eight of the ten states with the most cases listed in the Purdue exhibits have consolidated some or all of their cases in state MDLs.39
California (sixteenth on the list) also consolidated some of its cases in
a state MDL.40 In the order of quantity of cases listed in the Purdue
bankruptcy filing, the nine states with opioid MDLs are:
• New York: In 2017, New York used its institutional MDL to consolidate its state-court opioid cases.41 As of May 14, 2020, the
New York proceeding included sixty-three cases.42
• Pennsylvania: In 2018, the judge in the first action filed in Pennsylvania court used the state’s peer MDL procedure to transfer
sixteen opioid cases to himself in Delaware County.43 Later-filed
tion under Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005)); City of
Galax v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 7:18-cv-00617, 2019 WL 653010 (W.D. Va. Feb. 14, 2019)
(permitting the use of controversial pre-service or “snap” removal). See generally Zachary D.
Clopton & Alexandra D. Lahav, Fraudulent Removal, 134 HARV. L. REV. FORUM (forthcoming
2021).
36. See, e.g., County of Uintah v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 2-18-cv-00585-RJS, 2018 WL
3747847 (D. Utah Aug. 7, 2018). Although not presented in any opioid cases we are aware of,
state MDL consolidation for trial purposes may create “mass actions” for purposes of CAFA
removal. See Atwell v. Boston Sci. Corp., 740 F.3d 1160, 1161 (8th Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii) (excluding cases consolidated from pretrial purposes only from the definition of “mass actions”).
37. See, e.g., City of Galax v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 7:18-cv-00617, 2019 WL 653010 (W.D.
Va. Feb. 14, 2019).
38. See, e.g., Complaint, State v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. X07 HHD-CV-19-6105325-S
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 2019).
39. The two states with substantial numbers of unconsolidated cases are Oklahoma with
twenty-five cases and Utah with thirteen cases. Oklahoma has created ad hoc MDLs on previous
occasions but has not as of yet done so for opioid litigation. See Clopton & Rave, supra note 5, at
1661 (discussing Oklahoma’s ad hoc MDLs). It appears that many if not all of the Oklahoma
cases have since been removed to federal court so would not be candidates for state MDL at this
time.
40. Virginia presents an unusual situation. The Virginia Supreme Court used its institutional
MDL authority to convene an MDL Panel to consider consolidation of state opioid cases, but for
technical reasons, the MDL proceeding stalled. See Motion for Suspending Order, In re MultiCircuit Opioid Litig. (May 6, 2019) (including consolidation order as Exhibit A and stay order as
Exhibit B).
41. See Order Granting Defendants’ Application to Coordinate Cases and for Partial Stay
Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.69, County of Suffolk v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 613760/2016
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 19, 2017) (on file with author).
42. See Opioid Litigation Index Numbers, Index No: 400000/2017 - In re Opioid Litig. (on file
with authors).
43. See Order, County of Delaware v. Purdue Pharma L.P., CV-2017-008095 (Pa. Ct. C.P.
Mar. 26, 2018) (on file with authors).
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actions were also transferred to the same court, bringing the total to at least forty-one consolidated cases, though a suit by the
state attorney general (AG) remains pending in a separate
court.
West Virginia: In June 2019, West Virginia used its institutional
MDL to consolidate nineteen opioid cases; this has since grown
to at least fifty cases.44
Texas: Texas used its institutional MDL to consolidate at least
fifty-four opioid cases in front of Judge Robert Schaffer in
Houston.45
South Carolina: The South Carolina Supreme Court issued an ad
hoc MDL order consolidating all cases in front of Thirteenth
Circuit Court Judge Perry Gravely.46 Judge Gravely would handle consolidated pretrial proceedings in his own court and then
preside over any trials in the circuit courts in which they were
filed. 47 At least thirty-eight cases have been consolidated in this
manner.48
Illinois: The Illinois Supreme Court used its institutional MDL
powers to consolidate at least twenty-eight cases in a state MDL
in Cook County (Chicago).49
Massachusetts: All fifteen opioid cases listed in the bankruptcy
documents were transferred to the Suffolk County Business Litigation Session with Judge Janet L. Sanders, seemingly based
upon the peer MDL procedure.
Connecticut: State opioid cases were consolidated on the complex litigation docket, and it appears that at least some of these

44. See Administrative Order, Monongalia Cty. Comm’n v. Purdue Pharma L.P., Nos. 18-C222, 18-C-233, 18-C-234, 18-C-235, 18-C-236 (W. Va. June 7, 2019); Opioid Litigation, W. VA.
JUD., http://www.courtswv.gov/lower-courts/mlp/opioid.html (collecting documents); Bankruptcy
Exhibits, supra note 29 (listing cases as of September 2019); Order, In re Opioid Litig., No. 19-C9000 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 6, 2019) (transferring AG case, which was not listed as consolidated in
the bankruptcy exhibits).
45. See In re Texas Opioid Litig., No. 2018-63587 (Tex. Dist. Ct.). This includes forty-five of
the forty-eight cases mentioned in the bankruptcy exhibits and other cases not captured in those
exhibits.
46. Order, In re Opioid Litig., No. 2018-08-09-02 (S.C. Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.sccourts.org/
courtOrders/displayOrder.cfm?orderNo=2018-08-09-02.
47. Amended Order, In re Opioid Litig., No. 2018-08-23-01 (S.C. Aug. 23, 2018), https://
www.sccourts.org/courtOrders/displayOrder.cfm?orderNo=2018-08-23-01.
48. Case Management Order No. 1, Exhibit A, In re South Carolina Opioid Litig., No. 2018CP-23-01294 (S.C. Ct. C.P. June 26, 2019).
49. See Order, People v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 123090 (Ill. Jan. 29, 2018) (on file with
authors); Bankruptcy Exhibits, supra note 29.
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cases were referred to that court by the chief civil administrative
judge (presumably using the institutional MDL procedure).50
• California: On the same day that Purdue declared bankruptcy,
California used its institutional MDL to consolidate its opioid
litigation in Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No.
5029.51
All of these state MDLs include municipality plaintiffs, and all but
Pennsylvania include a state AG action.52 South Carolina’s MDL includes the state AG, but the AG action appears to get separate treatment within the MDL.53
Participation in state MDLs is not always consensual.54 Municipality
plaintiffs supported consolidation in California, Connecticut, Illinois,
Massachusetts, and New York, 55 while they opposed consolidation in
West Virginia.56 In Texas, the municipality plaintiffs conceded that the
criteria for consolidation may have been met but argued that the consolidation motion was premature.57 In Pennsylvania, the first-filed
municipality plaintiffs supported consolidation in their court (Delaware County).58 Most other municipality plaintiffs supported consolidation in Philadelphia County,59 and after the case was consolidated
50. See, e.g., City of New Haven v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. X07HHDCV176086134S, 2019
WL 423990 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 8, 2019); Complex Litigation Application (on file with
authors).
51. See Judicial Council of California Civil Case Coordination Proceeding (JCCP) Log, CAL.
CTS., https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/CivilCaseCoord_2015toPresent_JCCPLog.pdf.
52. The proto-MDL in Virginia did not include the AG action either. See supra note 41. Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia also included non-government plaintiffs.
53. Amended Order, In re Opioid Litig., No. 2018-08-23-01 (S.C. Aug. 23, 2018), https://
www.sccourts.org/courtOrders/displayOrder.cfm?orderNo=2018-08-23-01.
54. The descriptions in this paragraph were drawn from extensive searching of the dockets
and underlying documents in the state MDL proceedings (on file with authors).
55. See Order on Petition for Coordination, In re Prescription Opioid Cases, JCCP No. 5029
(Cal. Civ. Dep’t Super. Ct. Sept. 6, 2019); Application for Referral of Case to the Complex
Litigation Docket (CLD), City of New London v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. KNL-CV-186034326-S (Conn. Super. Ct. May 4, 2018); In re People v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No-18123090 (Ill.
Jan. 29, 2018); Order Granting Defendants’ Application to Coordinate Cases and for Partial Stay
Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.69, County of Suffolk v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 613760/2016
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 19, 2017). Information regarding Massachusetts plaintiffs is on file with
authors.
56. Administrative Order, Monongalia Cty. Comm’n v. Purdue Pharma L.P., Nos. 18-C-222,
18-C-233, 18-C-234, 18-C-235, 18-C-236 (W. Va. June 7, 2019).
57. In re Texas Opioid Litig., MDL No. 18-0358 (Tex. J.P.M.L. June 13, 2018).
58. Joint Motion for Pretrial Coordination and Defendants’ Motion for Stay of Actions at 2,
County of Delaware v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 2017-008095 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Jan. 25, 2018).
59. Joint Response of the Counties of Armstrong, Beaver, Cambria, Fayette, Greene, Lackawanna, Lawrence, Washington, and Westmoreland to the Joint Motion for Pretrial Coordination and for Stay of Actions, County of Delaware v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 2017-008095 (Pa.
Ct. C.P. Feb. 14, 2018); City of Philadelphia’s Response to the Joint Motion for Pretrial Coordination and for Stay of Actions, County of Delaware v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 2017-008095
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in Delaware County, some municipal plaintiffs filed a motion to terminate the proceeding.60 Those plaintiffs later dropped that motion61
when their lawyer was appointed to a leadership position in the state
MDL.62 With respect to the state actions, AGs expressly asked to be
included in the MDLs in Illinois63; they expressly opposed inclusion in
Texas64 and West Virginia65; and they requested only partial inclusion
in California.66 We found no evidence of defendants opposing state
MDL consolidation, though as noted above, defendants frequently
tried to avoid state-court jurisdiction in the first place.67
Finally, because plaintiffs’ lawyers often play an important role in
venue selection—after all, they are the ones who choose whether to
file in state or federal court—we collected information on the plaintiffs’ lawyers in these state MDLs and compared them to lawyers in
(Pa. Ct. C.P. Feb. 14, 2018); Response of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Acting By and
Through Philadelphia District Attorney Lawrence S. Krasner, to the Joint Motion for Pretrial
Coordination and for Stay of Actions, County of Delaware v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 2017008095 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Feb. 14, 2018).
60. Notice of Supplemental Information in Support of Motion to Terminate Pretrial Coordination by Plaintiffs, the Pennsylvania Counties of Armstrong, Beaver, Bradford, Cambria, Clarion, Fayette, Greene, Huntingdon, Lackawanna, Lawrence, Monroe, Washington, and
Westmoreland, County of Delaware County v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 2017-008095, (Pa. Ct.
C.P. Apr. 5, 2019).
61. Notice of Withdrawal of Motion to Terminate Pretrial Coordination by Plaintiffs, the
Pennsylvania Counties of Armstrong, Beaver, Bradford, Cambria, Clarion, Fayette, Greene,
Huntingdon, Lackawanna, Lawrence, Monroe, Washington, and Westmoreland, County of Delaware v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No.2017-008095, (Pa. Ct. C.P. May 31, 2019).
62. See Amended Order Appointing Leadership Structure, County of Delaware v. Purdue
Pharma L.P., No-2017-008095 (Pa. Ct. C.P. May 3, 2019). Appointment to a leadership or steering committee role in an MDL is often coveted position, as these lawyers often control how the
consolidated cases are managed and can be awarded lucrative common benefit fees for their
work. See, e.g., Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, It’s Good to Have the “Haves” on Your
Side: A Defense of Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation, 108 GEO. L.J. 73, 82 (2019).
63. In re People v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No.18123090 (Ill. Jan. 29, 2018).
64. Indeed, the Texas AG was so opposed to inclusion in the MDL that it immediately sought
remand and then appealed the MDL judge’s denial of its motion to the Texas MDL Panel. Order
Denying Motion for Rehearing, In re Texas Opioid Litig., No. 18-0358 (Tex. J.P.M.L. Mar. 21,
2019). When that proved unavailing, the Texas Attorney General convinced the legislature to
pass a statute retroactively exempting its enforcement action from state MDL treatment. S.B.
827 § 2, 86th Leg. (Tex. 2019) (codified as TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.1625 (West 2019)) (exempting claims under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and Texas Medicaid Fraud Prevention Act). See generally Rave & Clopton, supra note 7.
65. Order, In re Opioid Litig., No. 19-C-9000 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 6, 2019).
66. People of the State of California’s Opposition to Coordination Petition, In re Prescription
Opioid Cases, JCCP No. 5029 (Cal. Civ. Dep’t Super. Ct. Aug. 19, 2019); Order on Petition for
Coordination, In re Prescription Opioid Cases, JCCP No. 5029 (Cal. Civ. Dep’t Super. Ct. Sept.
6, 2019). In Connecticut and Massachusetts, the AG was already in the court to which plaintiffs
requested transfer. See Complaint, State v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. X07 HHD-CV-19-6105325S (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 2019); Complaint, State v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 18-180813 (Mass.
Super. Ct. June 12, 2018).
67. See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text.
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the federal MDL.68 State AGs tend to represent themselves, while
municipalities primarily have private representation. To be more
specific:
• New York: Four firms are listed as representing plaintiffs in New
York’s state MDL: (i) Simmons Hanly Conroy; (ii) Napoli
Shkolnik, PLLC; (iii) Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein; and
(iv) Frankfurt Kurnit Klein & Selz.69 The first two of these firms
are listed on the state-court master complaint, suggesting they
may be driving the state MDL (along with the AG). Both firms
have leadership roles in federal MDL (as does Lieff Cabraser)
and are participating in other state MDLs.
• Pennsylvania: As noted above, Pennsylvania’s leadership structure has changed over time.70 As of May 2019, the leadership
included representatives from eight firms: (i) Simmons Hanly
Conroy LLC; (ii) Pogust Millrood, LLC; (iii) Baron & Budd PC;
(iv) Motley Rice LLC; (v) Saltz Mongeluzzi Barrett & Bendesky
PC; (vi) Scott & Scott; (vii) Marc J. Bern & Partners LLP; and
(viii) Haviland Hughes.71 Three of these firms (Simmons Hanly
Conroy LLC, Baron & Budd PC, and Motley Rice LLC) have
roles in federal leadership. Three of these firms (Simmons Hanly
Conroy LLC; Scott & Scott; and Marc J. Bern & Partners LLP)
also have leadership roles in other state MDLs.
• West Virginia: Lead counsel for municipality plaintiffs are from
Napoli Shkolnik PLLC and The Chafin Law Firm.72 The former
has a leadership role in the federal MDL and in other states; the
latter has neither.
• Texas: The plaintiffs’ steering committee for municipality plaintiffs includes lawyers from twelve different firms: (i) Dan Downey PC; (ii) Fibich, Leebron, Copeland & Briggs; (iii) The
Gallagher Law Firm; (iv) The Lanier Law Firm; (v) Hendler
Flores Law; (vi) Fears Nachawati Law Firm; (vii) Perdue &
Kidd; (viii) Reich & Binstock, LLP; (ix); Law Offices of Richard
68. Results on file with authors. For the federal lawyers, see Court Docket, In Re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2020).
69. See Plaintiffs’ Master Long Form Complaint and Jury Demand, In re Opioid Litig., No.
400000/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 6, 2017); WebCivil Supreme—Case Detail, N.Y. ST. UNIFIED
CT. SYS. (last visited Apr. 20, 2020).
70. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
71. Order Appointing Leadership Structure, County of Delaware v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No.
17-008095 (Pa. Ct. C.P. June 13, 2018); Amended Order Appointing Leadership Structure,
County of Delaware v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 17-008095 (Pa. Ct. C.P. May 3, 2019).
72. Order Regarding Rulings Issued During the September 20, 2019 Status Conference, In re
Opioid Litig., No. 19-C-9000 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 9, 2019).
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Schechter, PC; (x) Simon Greenstone Panatier, PC; (xi) The
Snapka Law Firm; (xii) Watts Guerra LLP.73 Two of the twelve
firms have roles in the federal MDL leadership (The Lanier Law
Firm and Simon Greenstone Panatier, PC). None has a leadership role in another state MDL.
South Carolina: Plaintiffs’ liaison counsel are from four firms:
(i) Harrison White, P.C.; (ii) Marc J. Bern & Partners LLP; (iii)
Simmons Law Firm, LLC; and (iv) Finger, Melnick & Brooks,
P.A.74 None of these firms has a leadership role in the federal
MDL, and one (Marc J. Bern & Partners) is involved in another
state MDL.
Illinois: Only two firms have more than one case: Meyers &
Flowers (eleven cases) and Kralovec, Jambois, & Schwartz (nine
cases).75 Neither has a leadership role in the federal MDL or
another state MDL.
Massachusetts: Cases are primarily handled by Scott & Scott,
sometimes in conjunction with Anderson & Kreiger LLP.76
Neither of these firms has a leadership role in the federal MDL.
Scott & Scott has a role in other state MDLs.
Connecticut: Most cases identify plaintiffs’ lawyers from either
Scott & Scott or from three firms seemingly working together
(Drubner Hartley & Hellman LLC; Simmons Hanly Conroy
LLC; and Clendenen & Shea LLC).77 Simmons Hanly Conroy is
represented in federal leadership (and in other state MDLs).
None of the other firms has a federal leadership role. Scott &
Scott has a role in other state MDLs.
California: Coordination seems to be driven by one private firm,
Robins Kaplan.78 This firm does not have a leadership role in
the federal MDL or other state MDLs.

To summarize these findings, firms with leadership roles in federal
MDLs also hold leadership positions in some, but not all, state MDLs.
Indeed, some state MDL leadership teams include no federal leadership firms. Of the firms without federal leadership positions, some ap73. Order Appointing Leadership for the Plaintiffs, In re Texas Opioid Litig., No. 2018-63587
(Tex. Dist. Ct. Nov. 26, 2018).
74. Plaintiffs’ Statement in Support of Plaintiffs’ Proposed Case Management Order No. 3, In
re South Carolina Opioid Litig., No. 2018-CP-23-01294 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Feb. 19, 2020).
75. Information regarding Illinois lawyers is on file with authors.
76. Information regarding Massachusetts lawyers is on file with authors.
77. Information regarding Connecticut lawyers is on file with authors.
78. See Order on Petition for Coordination, In re Prescription Opioid Cases, JCCP No. 5029
(Cal. Civ. Dep’t Super. Ct. Sept. 6, 2019).
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pear to be players only in their home state, while others have roles in
more than one state MDL. So, at least in the context of municipal
mass tort litigation, plaintiffs’ law firms have the capacity to facilitate
trans-local organization within and across states.79
III.

ASSESSING STATE MDLS

The previous section used the opioid litigation to demonstrate how
state MDLs can permit groups of coordinated cases to proceed in
front of judges other than a federal MDL judge, and to be led at times
by lawyers outside the federal MDL leadership. To generalize, state
MDLs offer an intermediate level of consolidation between the nationwide consolidation of a federal MDL and the ordinary joinder
possible in a single state venue. And in doing so, state MDLs allow
additional—and potentially competing—power centers to form within
a nationwide mass tort litigation, but outside of the federal MDL.
As with any form of jurisdictional redundancy,80 these intermediate
levels of consolidation—and the intermediate power centers they create—could hold many advantages. But this form of redundancy also
comes with drawbacks in resolving mass litigation, such as the opioid
crisis. Here, we analyze those costs and benefits. Section A begins
with a discussion of the tradeoffs inherent in the notion of competing
power centers. Section B then turns to additional consequences of
state MDLs for federal mass tort litigation. The theoretical account in
this Part is not based entirely on the opioid litigation; indeed, the vagaries of any dispute mean that no real-world litigation will match any
ideal type. But we think that the account here is consistent with the
general dynamics of mass-tort litigation, and we think that the opioid
litigation tracks and helps illustrate many of those general
observations.
A. Competing Power Centers
Any form of aggregation creates a tradeoff on the claimants’ side:
Are the benefits of collective action worth the agency costs of aggre79. Cf. Judith Resnik et al., Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and
Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 709, 711–12 (2008).
80. Our thinking here builds on the substantial literature on jurisdictional redundancy. See,
e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation,
22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981); Martin H. Redish, Intersystemic Redundancy and Federal
Court Power: Proposing a Zero Tolerance Solution to the Duplicative Litigation Problem, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347 (2000); Alexandra D. Lahav, Recovering the Social Value of Jurisdictional Redundancy, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2369 (2008); Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private
Enforcement, 69 VAND. L. REV. 285 (2016). Our analysis here has particular resonance with the
important work of Professors Cover and Lahav, which we cite throughout.
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gated representation?81 Recent commentary on this tradeoff often
treats the federal MDL as the only game in town.82 The ability to litigate mass tort claims in state MDLs, however, allows some plaintiffs
(and some plaintiffs’ lawyers) to create competing power centers in
the states. This section first articulates the ways that these competing
power centers can be beneficial with respect to agency problems in
legal representation for plaintiffs. It then turns to the potential costs
of this approach in terms of the increased collective action problems
within litigation and the reduced ability to offer defendants global
peace or finality at the end of it.83
Before turning to this analysis, two caveats are in order. First, at
least in the opioid litigation, there is another important power
center—the state AGs who have brought their own public enforcement and parens patriae actions against opioid defendants. Indeed,
one major fault line that has emerged in the opioid litigation is between the private lawyers at the head of the federal MDL and several
state attorneys general.84 Because our goal is to explain the place of
state MDLs in the mass litigation ecosystem, and because state MDLs
afford platforms for interests to coalesce distinct from either the federal leaders or the state AGs, our focus here is not on the AG lawsuits. Additionally, there will be many mass tort cases in which state
MDLs are active but state AGs play no role, suggesting that the state
MDL aspects of the opioid case may be more generalizable than the
important, but less common, AG suits.85
Second, we focus here on relationships on the plaintiffs’ side. We do
so because the plaintiffs’ side of mass torts has drawn the attention of
commentators and because—at least in our view—the presence of
state MDLs can have a dramatic effect on those relations. To be sure,
in some mass torts, including the opioid litigation, there will be complex relationships on the defendants’ side as well. But defendant-side
81. See, e.g., D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation, 66
VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1213–15 (2013).
82. See infra notes 86–90 and accompanying text.
83. Using Cover and Lahav’s framework, we are talking here about “interest.” See Cover,
supra note 81, at 658–62; Lahav, supra note 81, at 2403–04. Defendants in mass litigation tend to
value closure and are often willing to pay a peace premium to settle all pending claims in a single
transaction. See generally Rave, supra note 81.
84. See, e.g., Alison Frankel, State AGs pose big obstacle for novel opioids negotiating class
proposal, REUTERS (June 26, 2019, 4:31 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-opioids/
state-ags-pose-big-obstacle-for-novel-opioids-negotiating-class-proposal-idUSKCN1TR35R.
85. We would say the same things about the Purdue bankruptcy: Though the bankruptcy proceeding itself is a separate power center, it does not help us explain the role of state MDLs in
mass tort cases.
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relationships have received far less scholarly attention, and we think
state MDLs are less likely to play a substantial role in shaping them.
1. Agency Problems
One vocal strand of criticism of federal MDL is that it is dominated
by a handful of repeat-player plaintiffs’ lawyers who can collude with
each other (and potentially with the defendant) to suppress competition from other lawyers to the detriment of their one-shot clients.86 Of
course, the lead lawyers in the federal MDL are not the only plaintiffs’
lawyers in a controversy as massive as the opioid litigation.87 Appointment to a leadership position in a federal MDL does not give a lawyer
“monopoly” control over all of the cases in the same way as appointment as class counsel in a class action.88 Other lawyers will have cases
inside and outside of the federal MDL, and they may push back
against the decisions of the lead lawyers or advise their clients not to
go along with any settlement negotiated by the federal leaders. Yet
critics still worry that the lead lawyers will co-opt potential dissenters
through their perch at the head of the litigation, their ability to distribute common benefit work (and fees), and their prior relationships.89 So, while the power of this repeat-player “cartel” may be
overstated,90 there are real risks that lead lawyers’ interests may not
align perfectly with their clients’ interests, and that they may use their
positions to try to undercut potential competitors.
One way that competing lawyers might consider escaping the
clutches of federal MDL leadership would be to file their cases in
state courts. But even when state court litigation is possible, it may not
be practical. The rules of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction
make nationwide aggregation in state court impracticable, except in
86. See, e.g., ELIZABETH CHAMBLEE BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS: BACKROOM BARGAINING IN
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 2–4 (2019); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict
Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 67, 73–74 (2017) [hereinafter Burch, Monopolies]; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1445, 1459 (2017).
87. In the opioid litigation, state attorneys general have been a powerful counterweight to the
private lawyers at the head of the federal MDL. But the interests of the state attorneys general
are not necessarily aligned with the cities and counties that make up the bulk of the plaintiffs
either—particularly on the question of who will control any settlement proceeds. See generally
Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys
General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486 (2012).
88. See Bradt & Rave, supra note 62, at 109; cf. Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 164 (2003).
89. See, e.g., Burch, Monopolies, supra note 87, at 122–24.
90. See Bradt & Rave, supra note 62, at 111–14.
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the states where plaintiffs are least likely to want to sue.91 And litigating one case at a time across hundreds of state courthouses is unlikely
to be attractive or cost-effective in most mass torts. Without a way to
aggregate state cases, the option to use state courts to compete meaningfully with the federal MDL is illusory.
State MDLs, however, offer a ready-made means for state-by-state
aggregation in state court.92 As such, they allow state courts to be venues for substantial competing power centers to form within a mass
litigation. Lawyers who are (or expect to be) shut out of leadership
positions in the federal MDL might look to secure leadership positions in state MDLs.93 Leadership over a state MDL essentially subsidizes the competing power center by giving these lawyers effective
control over a substantial number of cases filed by other lawyers
around the state.94 The state lawyers’ independence from their federal
counterparts is magnified because the state judge is an independent
decision maker that can speed up or slow down different parts of the
litigation or make different rulings on important motions.95 For example, it only takes one state judge to rule that discovery material should
be made public for potentially damaging information to come out—an
outcome that defendants might be willing to pay a premium to avoid.
96 This independence gives state leaders leverage to push back against
the strategic decisions of the lead lawyers in the federal MDL— more
leverage than simply having a large inventory of cases in the federal
MDL or in uncoordinated state courts. If the federal lead lawyers are
settling too cheaply in exchange for outsized common benefit fees, the
leaders of a state MDL are in a position to object in at least a subset
91. The Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) makes it nearly impossible to sustain any sort of
multistate class action in state court. And after the Supreme Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017), plaintiffs will have trouble sustaining even
multistate non-class aggregations in any state that does not have general jurisdiction over the
defendant. See Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms: Bristol-Myers Squibb and the Federalization of Mass Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1251, 1256–57
(2018). Federal courts are thus likely to absorb most but not all related cases in mass torts, and
the residual cases will likely be spread across state court systems.
92. See Clopton & Rave, supra note 5, at 1715–18.
93. We have more to say about law firm decision-making below. See infra Part.III.A.4.
94. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies
and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119,
2145–47 (2000) (characterizing aggregation as a subsidy of private litigation).
95. See, e.g., Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 306–18 (2011) (holding that a federal judge
may not enjoin a state court from granting motion to certify a class action that a federal court
had denied in a related case).
96. For more in this volume on the issue of publicity, see Alexandra D. Lahav & Elizabeth
Chamblee Burch, Information for the Common Good in Mass Torts, 70 DEPAUL L. REV. 2
(2021).
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of cases and potentially expose the federal leaders’ self-dealing.97 To
the extent that a lack of competition is increasing agency costs in
mass-tort plaintiffs’ legal representation, state MDLs can help
counteract this effect.98
In this way, state MDLs can play a similar checking function as state
governments within our federal system. When one political party is
shut out of power at the federal level, it may still be able to win control over one or more state governments, and from that position, push
back against the policies of the dominant party in Washington D.C. 99
Think of California’s relationship to the Trump administration, or
Texas’s relationship to the Obama administration.100 There are limits,
of course, to the opposition party’s ability to shape national policy
from this perch. States’ territorial reach is limited, their laws can be
preempted, and they can be bribed into compliance through conditional federal spending.101 But the smaller units of state government
give the opposition party a place to coalesce and affect real policy in
ways that they might be shut out from at the federal level.102
97. See Lahav, supra note 81, at 2402 (“The risk of collusion may be reduced by multicenteredness because competition will make it more difficult for defendants to buy off plaintiffs’ counsel at the expense of the class.”). Note, too, that because the federal leadership cannot
settle state cases and the state leadership cannot settle federal cases, there is no risk of a “reverse
auction” by defendant among plaintiffs’ counsel. See Bradt & Rave, supra note 62, at 109–10; cf.
Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 473 (2000); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1354, 1370–73
(1995); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Corruption of the Class Action: The New Technology of Collusion, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 853–54 (1995). In fact, institutional forms of state MDL (like
their federal counterpart) further reduce the risk of a reverse auction. Even if the defendant
eschewed CAFA removal, cf. Robert H. Klonoff & Mark Herrmann, The Class Action Fairness
Act: An Ill-Conceived Approach to Class Settlements, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1695, 1710 (2006), the
settling parties cannot shop around for a pliant state court judge to approve a class action settlement because an external judicial actor—not the parties themselves—chooses the judge who will
handle the consolidated actions. See Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The InformationForcing Role of the Judge in Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1303 (2017).
98. Certainly this is the premise of the repeat-player critics mentioned above.
99. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1748–50,
1782–83 (2005); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 58
(2004).
100. Then-Attorney General of Texas Greg Abbott described his job in 2013 as “I go into the
office, I sue the federal government, and I go home.” Richard Fausset, In Texas, Distrust of
Washington Collides With Need for Federal Aid, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/09/04/us/texas-storm-federal-aid-abbott-cruz.html.
101. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VI (Supremacy Clause); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877)
(states’ territorial reach limited); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding conditional spending); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (noting ways Congress can
preempt state law).
102. Particularly in times of strong partisan polarization, the governor of Texas or California
may have considerably greater ability to affect policy—and therefore leverage in negotiating
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By providing ready-made machinery for aggregating and coordinating cases at the state level, state MDLs can play a similar function in
mass litigation. Lead lawyers in state MDLs may not have as much
influence over the direction of the larger litigation or settlement leverage with the defendant as the federal leaders. But lead lawyers in state
MDLs do have a platform to act independently from, and push back
against, the federal lead lawyers when it comes to litigating or settling
the cases.
To be sure, there is substantial overlap between the state and federal lawyers in the opioid litigation.103 This sort of overlap is common
in mass torts. And the resolution of federal and state cases is likely to
be interdependent; a settlement in federal court may be contingent on
what happens to the state court cases, and vice versa.104 But as long as
the state MDL lawyers control a somewhat independent set of cases,
they can still act as a counterweight to the federal MDL leadership.
Indeed, control of cases that proceed independently of the federal
MDL potentially gives these state MDL lawyers more influence than
they might have if the same set of cases were inside the federal MDL.
Recognizing this dynamic, the federal lead lawyers will undoubtedly
attempt to capture leadership positions in state MDLs for themselves
or their allies. But that strategy may prove more challenging than it
first appears. In politics, it is difficult for the dominant party at the
federal level to win in all of the smaller state units. The same holds
true in litigation. Because states differ in the ways they select their
judges and the ways they assign MDL cases, the varied terrain can
make it difficult for the federal leaders to win all of the state leadership contests. Competing lawyers only need to win a leadership contest in one state MDL to gain some independence, and thus, gain
some leverage with respect to any potential global settlement. To give
one example, Pennsylvania’s first-filed rule allows forward-thinking
plaintiffs’ firms to put a thumb on the scale toward coordination in
their preferred court by deciding where to file first.105 The judge in the
first-filed case will then decide if and where to consolidate the cases; if
that judge keeps the cases, that judge will also decide which lawyers to
with the majority party in Washington—than the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives or the Senate.
103. See supra notes 68–78 and accompanying text.
104. See Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1769, 1784–95 (2005) (discussing interdependence); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE
LITIGATION § 3.16 (A.L.I. 2010) (discussing interdependence).
105. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. The rule in Pennsylvania’s peer MDL system is
that the judge handling the first-filed case decides whether and where to consolidate cases. See
id.
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appoint to leadership positions.106 The availability of state MDLs thus
further complicates the repeat-player “cartel” story.107
We can see this dynamic playing out in the opioid litigation. While
some of the lead lawyers in the federal MDL have secured leadership
positions in several state MDLs, other firms, which are not part of the
federal leadership, appear to have control in other states. In New
York, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Texas, and Connecticut, law firms
that are part of the leadership structure in the federal opioid MDL
hold some of the leadership positions in the state MDLs.108 But in
California, South Carolina, Illinois, and Massachusetts, none of the
lead law firms in the state MDLs appear to have any formal role in the
federal leadership.109 Indeed, two firms that have no federal leadership roles—Marc J. Bern & Partners LLP and Scott & Scott—have
secured leadership positions in multiple state MDLs.110 Those positions could give lawyers in those firms significant leverage to push
back against the federal leadership.
Observing the give and take among lawyers in a complex dispute
such as the opioid litigation is challenging as outsiders, to say the least.
But when the federal lead lawyers proposed a novel negotiation class
to present a united front in settlement negotiations, many of the cities
and counties with cases pending in state MDLs opted out, preferring
to negotiate with the defendants on their own.111 Indeed, several of
the lead lawyers in state MDLs filed an amicus brief asking the Sixth
Circuit to reverse the federal MDL judge’s certification of the negotiation class.112 This may be some evidence of the ability and willingness
106. See id.
107. Cf. Burch, Monopolies, supra note 87; Burch & Williams, supra note 87.
108. These firms are (by state): Simmons Hanly Conroy (NY, PA, CT), Napoli Shkolnik
PLLC (NY, WV), Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Berns (NY), Barron & Budd (PA), Mottley Rice
(PA), The Lanier Law Firm (TX), Simon Greenstone Panatier (TX). For more, see supra notes
68–78 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 68–78 and accompanying text.
110. Marc J. Bern & Partners LLP holds leadership positions in Pennsylvania and South Carolina. Scott & Scott holds leadership positions in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Connecticut.
For more, see supra notes 68–78 and accompanying text. It’s worth noting that Marc. J. Bern was
a founding partner of Napoli Bern Ripka Shkolnik, but in 2015, the firm broke up in dramatic
fashion that played out across the pages of the New York Post. See Napoli Bern, N.Y. POST
https://nypost.com/tag/napoli-bern/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2021). One successor firm, Napoli
Shkolnik PLLC, has maintained an active federal MDL practice and secured leadership positions in the federal opioid litigation, as well as two state MDLs. Marc J. Bern & Partners LLP
appears to have focused solely on state practice in the opioid cases.
111. See Request for Negotiation Class, supra note 35 (listing municipalities that opted out of
the negotiation class).
112. Brief Amici Curiae of Certain Opted-Out Entities in Support of Appellants and Requesting a Reversal of the Certification Decision Below, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., Nos.
19-4099 & 19-4097 (6th Cir. Feb. 14, 2020) (including lawyers from Watts Guerra LLP (lead in
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of outside lawyers to use state aggregation to push their cases in a
different direction from the federal leaders.
2. Collective Action Problems in Litigation
Even if state MDLs are successful at reducing attorney agency
costs, they do so at a price.113 One part of that price is that the disaggregation of mass torts reintroduces collective action problems among
plaintiffs that justified aggregation in the first place.114
Mass tort plaintiffs have built-in disadvantages when they face off
against mass tort defendants. Plaintiffs are typically dispersed and uncoordinated, and they are often first-time users of the legal system
who have an interest only in their own cases.115 Mass tort defendants,
by contrast, tend to be experienced repeat players who can spread
costs and risk across the entire series of cases filed against them.116
This imbalance is perhaps less stark in the opioid litigation, where
most of the plaintiffs are public entities and there are many defendants who must coordinate their responses, but the basic dynamic still
holds.117 The plaintiffs face a collective action problem.
Texas), Reich & Binstock LLP (lead in Texas), Marc J. Bern & Partners LLP (lead in Pennsylvania and South Carolina), Harrison White PC (lead in South Carolina), Kralovec, Jambois,
& Schwartz (lead in Illinois)).
113. Of course, there is no guarantee that competing state MDLs will in fact reduce agency
costs or will lead to optimal settlements. As Lahav explains: “Multiplicity is not a cure for the
problems caused by the prevalence of private interests in litigation. It merely destabilizes the
ability of some interests to completely control the litigation. In this way it is a weapon against
control by particular interests.” Lahav, supra note 81, at 2403–04.
114. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, “Vital” State Interests: From Representative Actions for Fair Labor Standards to Pooled Trusts, Class Actions, and MDLs in the Federal Courts, 165 U. PA. L.
REV. 1765, 1779–82 (2017).
115. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).
116. See id. In labeling the collective action problem a cost, we are obviously adopting the
plaintiffs’ perspective. Defendants are quite happy to face opponents hampered by a collective
action problem. There may be arguments that enabling plaintiffs to more effectively sue together
leads to more efficient deterrence or more accurate enforcement of the substantive law. See, e.g.,
Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1079–81 (2012); David
Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115
HARV. L. REV. 831, 852–53 (2002). Or, conversely, that aggregation may amplify errors in the
substantive law. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification, and
Distortion, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 475, 478. We treat this as a cost consistent with the MDL
reform literature, but readers are free to adopt the opposite perspective.
117. Indeed, some municipalities may be quite sophisticated litigants with their own law departments and considerable ability to either litigate on their own or monitor any private counsel
they have retained. See, e.g., Kathleen S. Morris, Cities Seeking Justice: Local Government Litigation in the Public Interest, in HOW CITIES WILL SAVE THE WORLD: URBAN INNOVATION IN
THE FACE OF POPULATION FLOWS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY (2016). But
that level of sophistication does not hold across the board, and there are still many more munici-
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A federal MDL can go a long way towards solving that collective
action problem by collecting the bulk of the plaintiffs into a single
forum and forcing them to work together. Lead lawyers do most of
the important work driving the litigation forward during the pretrial
phase and taking the lead in settlement negotiations with the defendant.118 The MDL court will “tax” the fees of non-lead lawyers in order to pay the lead lawyers for the “common benefit” work that they
do.119 This allows the lead lawyers to invest in the litigation on nearly
the same scale that defendants do, knowing that they will be able to
recoup some of the benefit that their efforts provide to plaintiffs who
are not their clients if the litigation is successfully resolved.120
The existence of competing power centers in state MDLs may make
it harder to coordinate the litigation among plaintiffs—without any
changes on the defendants’ side. Plaintiffs and their lawyers in state
court are beyond the jurisdiction of the federal MDL judge, which
may complicate common-benefit fee assessments.121 Some state lawyers may attempt to free ride on the work done by the federal leadership in the hopes that their clients’ cases will be included in any global
settlement, even if they did little work themselves. And they may resist paying into the common-benefit fund, which reduces the incentives of the federal lead lawyers to invest in the litigation. If the
market for legal services works, then we should expect that federal
lead lawyers secured their positions because they would deliver the
best return to the plaintiffs—having inferior lawyers pursuing different strategies in state court may just mess everything up.122 Competing power centers, in other words, are not free.
pal plaintiffs involved in the opioid litigation than there are opioid defendants, making collective
action on the plaintiffs’ side correspondingly more challenging.
118. See, e.g., Bradt & Rave, supra note 98, at 1271–72.
119. See, e.g., Eldon E. Fallon, Common Benefit Fees in Multidistrict Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV.
371, 374–75 (2014); see also FED. JUD. CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 14.12 (Stanley Marcus et al. eds., 4th ed. 2004).
120. See, e.g., Bradt & Rave, supra note 61, at 94–98.
121. That is not to say that there is no way to get state lawyers to contribute. Global MDL
settlements negotiated by the federal leaders often require state lawyers to consent to paying
into the common benefit fund if they want their clients to participate in the settlement. See, e.g.,
Burch & Williams, supra note 87, at 1512–13. Federal MDL judges sometimes assert power over
lawyers who have cases in both federal and state court (though the practice is controversial). See,
e.g., Margaret S. Thomas, Morphing Case Boundaries in Multidistrict Litigation Settlements, 63
EMORY L.J. 1339, 1368–69 (2014). And the federal lead lawyers may sell state lawyers “discovery
packets” or “trial packets” in private transactions, though it can be difficult to capture all of the
positive externalities created by the federal leaders’ efforts in those transactions.
122. George Conway—yes, that George Conway!—offered a solution to this problem when
he suggested that the JPML should be able consolidate cases to and from state courts. See generally George T. Conway III, The Consolidation of Multistate Litigation in State Courts, 96 YALE
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3. Collective Action Problems in Settlement
Collective action problems also arise with respect to settlement. In
many mass torts, defendants value finality and are sometimes willing
to pay a premium for a settlement that can resolve all of the plaintiffs’
claims and allow them to put the entire dispute behind them.123 Plaintiffs therefore stand to gain if they can bundle all their claims together
to settle in a single transaction.124 Doing so allows them to credibly
offer the defendant peace in exchange for a premium that they can
share among themselves—a proposition that can leave both sides better off.125 Indeed, this is the idea behind the novel negotiation class
that Judge Polster certified in the opioid MDL.126 The negotiation
class essentially created a bargaining unit of all cities and counties in
the nation—except those that affirmatively opt out at the outset—that
would be bound by any settlement approved by a supermajority of the
class members.127 The class was thus a vehicle for the federal lead lawyers to offer the defendants peace and extract a premium in exchange.
128

Competing power centers in state MDLs may complicate efforts to
achieve global resolution, to the detriment of plaintiffs, defendants,
and the court system alike. If plaintiffs find intermediate aggregation
in state MDLs an attractive alternative to the federal MDL, the difficulty of piecing together a global settlement will likely increase. Instead of having nearly all of the claims pending in a single forum—and
all the important players in a single room—they will be spread out all
over the country. With more cooks in more kitchens, transaction costs
will go up. Worse still, some lawyers may use the leverage they have
attained at the head of competing state court proceedings to threaten
to hold up a global settlement that could benefit all parties unless they
are paid off.129 In short, creating competing power centers within the
litigation also enables strategic holdouts.
L.J. 1099 (1987). Even if we thought this were a good idea, we do not think this is in cards any
time soon.
123. See Rave, supra note 82, at 1185; Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the
Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733, 760–63 (1997).
124. See Rave, supra note 82, at 1185.
125. Id.
126. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 332 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Ohio 2020).
127. See Francis E. McGovern & William B. Rubenstein, The Negotiation Class: A Cooperative Approach to Class Actions Involving Large Stakeholders, 99 TEX. L. REV. 73 (2020).
128. Id. at 79, 104–07. The Sixth Circuit ultimately reversed Judge Polster’s certification of the
negotiation class, finding it inconsistent with the requirements of the federal class action rule. In
re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 976 F.3d 664, 677 (6th Cir. 2020).
129. Walkaway provisions that allow the defendant to terminate the deal if a certain threshold
of plaintiffs do not participate are common in mass tort settlements, creating an opportunity for
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Again, the opioid litigation is illustrative. While no competing lawyers succeeded in holding up the negotiation class, many cities and
counties with cases pending in state MDLs did opt out, retaining the
right to negotiate separately with the defendants.130 This makes it
much harder for the federal leaders to offer the defendants the total
peace that might be necessary to resolve the dispute.131
4. Law Firm Dynamics
Finally, before leaving our discussion of competing power centers,
we want to acknowledge opportunities that state MDLs create for
plaintiffs’ law firms that may or may not inure to the benefit of plaintiffs themselves.132
First, there are opportunities for strategic diversification.133 There
may not be a single optimal strategy to litigate a case. The creation of
multiple power centers within the litigation—controlled by different
lawyers operating in front of different judges—may allow the plaintiffs to pursue a “mixed strategy” that could produce a better overall
expected outcome.134 To be sure, the results in federal and state courts
small coordinated groups of plaintiffs to act strategically. See, e.g., D. Theodore Rave, Closure
Provisions in MDL Settlements, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2175, 2179–81 (2017).
130. Request for Negotiation Class, supra note 35. More than 98% of municipalities within
the class definition did not opt out. See id.
131. The negotiation class would still offer the parties something quite valuable. It defines the
universe of claims over which they are (and are not) negotiating in advance of the settlement.
Thus, at the time the defendants make an offer to the negotiation class, they would already know
that they need to negotiate separately with, for example, Houston and factor that information
into their calculus. Without the negotiation class, defendants would open themselves up to adverse selection when they make an offer to settle all claims; they may end up overpaying the
weakest claims only to learn at the end which claims are the strongest when they refuse to
participate. See McGovern & Rubenstein, supra note 128. The bigger problem with the negotiation class in the opioid litigation—before the Sixth Circuit shut it down—was not that some
municipalities had opted out, but that the state attorneys general were not on board. But, as
noted above, although the state attorneys general are a powerful counterweight to the federal
leadership, their interests may not align fully with either the municipalities in the class or those
that have opted out. See supra note 87.
132. Whether one thinks that these options benefit plaintiffs themselves will depend on one’s
priors about (among others) the functioning of the market for legal services, the relative risk of
agency problems in federal MDL, and the importance of distributional concerns among
claimants.
133. This point connects with Cover’s and Lahav’s discussions of “innovation” in their work
on jurisdictional redundancy. See Cover, supra note 80, at 672–74; Lahav, supra note 80, at
2404–07.
134. A somewhat related point is that the presence of different attorneys in different venues
might permit for the inclusion of more diverse viewpoints. There is a large literature on the value
of diversity that is beyond the scope of this project, but at a minimum it is important to note that
diverse viewpoints can help correct cognitive biases only to the extent that they are uncorrelated,
so merely identifying “new voices” does not ensure that they will serve the bias-correcting function of perspectival diversity.
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are likely to be interdependent. Trial outcomes in one system will affect settlement values in the others.135 And any global settlement that
might emerge will have to account for cases in both federal and state
courts. But the federal and state leaders might choose different approaches in their respective proceedings. Defendants do not like “bet
the company” litigation.136 Plaintiffs’ firms might also see some advantages in not putting all of their eggs in the federal leaders’ strategic
basket.
In addition, state MDLs allow plaintiffs’ law firms to engage in
portfolio diversification.137 Plaintiffs’ firms often collect portfolios or
“inventories” of clients to try to spread out the risk of any given case
panning out and resulting in a contingency fee.138 These firms also
might attempt to diversify their portfolios across federal and state
courts. Doing so gives plaintiffs’ firms more opportunities to win
greater control in one or more consolidated proceedings, which could
translate into leverage in settlement negotiations both with the defendant and vis-à-vis the federal lead lawyers.
Different types of firms may have different approaches to this form
of diversification. Smaller firms might believe they have little chance
of winning a leadership contest in the federal MDL. Therefore, they
may attempt to keep as many of their cases as possible in state court,
where they might have at least some shot of obtaining a leadership
role in a state MDL. Some firms in the opioid litigation have behaved
in ways that are at least consistent with this strategy.139 Larger firms—
even the top “repeat players” in federal MDL—will likely file at least
some cases in state court as well. Doing so gives them a hedge against
the chance of losing the federal leadership contest to another large
firm. And even if they succeed in securing a leadership role in federal
court, firms may try to gain control over as many state MDLs as possible to fend off any unwelcome competitors. Again, in the opioid litigation, there are examples of firms behaving consistently with this
description.140
135. See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, Mass Litigation Governance in the Post-Class Action Era: The
Problems and Promise of Non-removable State Actions in Multi-district Litigation, 5 J. TORT L. 3
(2012).
136. Cf. Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1357 (2003).
137. Here, we return to “interest” in the language of Cover and Lahav. See Cover, supra note
80, at 658–62; Lahav, supra note 80, at 2399–04.
138. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, “Shocked”: Mass Torts and Aggregate Asbestos Litigation
After Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1925, 1928 (2002).
139. See supra notes 109–110 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. It is important to note that not all mass tort
lawyers aspire to leadership roles in MDLs. These positions can be very lucrative, but they also
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The litigation ecosystem of a mass tort dispute like the opioid litigation is complex; state MDLs can make it more complex. For any number of reasons, some plaintiffs’ firms will choose to take advantage of
state MDL procedures. In doing so, they may form competing power
centers that help control the principal-agent problem in mass representation. At the same time, they may also exacerbate the collective
action problem that plaintiffs face in mass torts. And the ability to sue
in multiple forums creates opportunities for strategic behavior among
plaintiffs’ lawyers that may or may not help their clients in the end.
The tradeoffs among reduced agency costs, increased collective actions problems, and law-firm dynamics are complex and case-specific,
so we cannot offer a general accounting of them here. But, as demonstrated by the opioid litigation, the presence of state MDLs can affect
those tradeoffs in ways that merit attention.
B. Consequences for Mass Tort Litigation
Thinking about state MDLs and the power centers they create suggests additional consequences beyond the plaintiffs’ side dynamics discussed above. Here, we identify two such effects. First, at the
beginning of the litigation, state MDLs interact with federal MDLs by
creating options for parties who are uncomfortable with the judge selected to handle the federal MDL. Second, once the litigation is up
and running, state MDLs facilitate interjurisdictional cooperation at
least relative to a universe with satellite state cases but not state
MDLs.
1. Alternative Forums
Both critics and proponents of federal MDL acknowledge the substantial power assigned to the MDL transferee judge. 141 That single
judge will rule on all matters in all consolidated cases until they settle
typically require specialized knowledge and sizable capital investment. Mass tort law firms have
many different business models. See Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding
Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 1042–43
(1993). Some lawyers carefully screen cases to find high-value claims to take to trial, others
attempt to aggregate as many cases as possible in the hopes of funneling them into a global
settlement, and still others act as lead generators who refer cases to aggregators. See Bradt &
Rave, supra note 61, at 111. All those business models can provide their own forms of leverage
in the mass litigation environment. Our point here is simply that among the subset of firms that
do aspire to leadership roles, state MDLs provide opportunities for diversification.
141. See, e.g., Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 131–35 (2010);
Bradt & Rave, supra note 98, at 1290–92.
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or that judge decides pretrial proceedings are over.142 Once cases are
transferred to an MDL, there is practically no way for the parties to
escape the chosen MDL judge.143 If the chosen federal MDL judge is
unfriendly or out to lunch, the parties are stuck.
State MDLs, however, give at least some parties additional options
because they can direct later-filed cases to state MDLs instead of subjecting them to the federal MDL judge’s influence.144 This move is less
about competing with the federal power center and more about avoiding it. For example, if the federal MDL Panel picks a judge that is
perceived to be defendant-friendly, later-filing plaintiffs may prefer a
lesser degree of aggregation over proceeding in front of an unfavorable judge. State MDLs give them that intermediate option; they can
attempt to structure their cases to remain in state court without foregoing all of the advantages of consolidation.145
If the federal MDL judge is truly rogue, plaintiffs and defendants
might agree that proceeding in a state MDL is preferable. In that situation, defendants might forgo removal or objections to personal jurisdiction in state courts. The parties might even voluntarily dismiss
cases from the federal MDL and refile them in state court. Because
the state cases may be consolidated in a state MDL, these parties are
able to avoid the federal MDL without forgoing the benefits of
coordination.
To be clear, we do not think that Judge Polster has gone rogue,
though we suspect that some of the parties in these state MDLs did!
2. Cooperating Power Centers
Once a mass tort litigation is proceeding in multiple courts, the
question will arise how those aggregate proceedings might work together. In earlier sections, we have emphasized the role of state MDLs
142. See, e.g., Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Nonclass Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 994–95 (2012).
143. There is a robust debate among complex litigation scholars as to whether a federal MDL
more closely resembles a black hole or a roach motel. Fewer than 3% of cases are ever actually
remanded to transferor courts. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, 75 LA. L. REV. 399, 400–01 (2014).
144. One way to conceptualize what is going on in these situations is that state MDLs allow
for diversification along the lines of “ideology.” See Cover, supra note 80, at 662–68; Lahav,
supra note 80, at 2407–13.
145. For example, if the only potential basis for federal jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship,
then removal is not proper if a properly joined and served defendant is a citizen of the forum
state. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). Thus adding a claim against a local pharmacy in a drug defect
case, for example, may be enough to keep the case in state court. See also supra note 33 and
accompanying text (noting that plaintiffs can plead their cases to get into or out of federal court).
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as competing power centers,146 but these consolidated state proceedings also can serve as cooperating power centers. The straightforward
idea here is that once there are related cases being litigated in parallel
across different court systems, it helps to coordinate cases within each
court system.
Without cooperation, parties and courts risk needless duplication of
effort. For this reason, policymakers and scholars have long encouraged federal MDL judges to actively coordinate with state judges
handling similar cases.147 State MDLs can make the process of cooperation easier by consolidating cases at the state level. Put simply, it is
easier to coordinate a set of 50 than 500.148 Or, to put it in terms of the
opioid litigation, Judge Polster could coordinate with more than three
quarters of the state cases by talking to the nine judges handling state
MDLs.149
Of course, this idea assumes the existence of satellite state cases.
We think this is a fair assumption, at least under current law. The rules
of federal subject-matter jurisdiction mean that some cases related to
a federal MDL will be litigated in state court.150 And the rules of personal jurisdiction and other doctrines mean that not all state-court
cases will be filed in a single state. 151 In other words, alongside federal mass tort MDLs, there are nearly always satellite cases pending in
state courts. And some commentators think that there are special reasons for certain cases to be their home state courts (e.g., suits by state
146. See supra Part III.A.
147. See FED. JUD. CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 10.225 (Stanley Marcus et al.
eds., 4th ed. 2004); FED. JUD. CTR. ET AL., COORDINATING MULTIJURISDICTION LITIGATION: A
POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES (2013). For earlier examples of interjurisdictional judicial cooperation, see generally Francis E. McGovern, Rethinking Cooperation Among Judges in Mass Tort
Litigation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1851 (1997) (discussing inter alia asbestos and breast implant
litigation).
148. See Clopton & Rave, supra note 5, at 1715–16.
149. See supra notes 41–51 and accompanying text. Indeed, Judge Polster has been actively
coordinating with state proceedings. He appointed a committee of federal lawyers to coordinate
discovery in related state and federal cases under the supervision of a special master. Order
Designating Attorneys Address Coordination of State/Federal Discovery, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP, (N.D. Ohio June 13, 2018). And he issued a protocol
for such coordination. Protocol for State and Federal Court Coordination, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Oct. 9, 2018).
150. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806).
151. That is, unless that state has general jurisdiction over the defendant. See Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017). Though even states with general
jurisdiction may not want to hear those cases. See, e.g., Aranda v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 183
A.3d 1245, 1253 (Del. 2018) (“Delaware has no real connection to the dispute except for the
defendants’ place of incorporation. It is not unfair to suggest that, rather than requiring cases to
proceed in Delaware in the absence of an alternative forum, the Superior Court should consider,
on a case-by-case basis, whether the court’s resources should be deployed to resolve cases with
little connection to Delaware . . .”).

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\70-2\DPL205.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 29

OPIOID CASES AND STATE MDLS

16-DEC-21

15:54

273

or local governments).152 For whatever reason some related cases remain in state courts, the idea here is that there is a benefit for them to
remain consolidated in state courts.
IV. CONCLUSION
State MDLs are an important and underappreciated aspect of the
mass tort ecosystem. In almost every nationwide mass tort litigation
there will be state cases alongside the federal MDL, and the rise of
state MDLs mean that many of those cases can be joined into competing power centers. This is neither a completely welcome nor unwelcomed development—but it is an important development
deserving of further study.
As we conclude this Article, we want to step even further back to
discuss the relationship between state MDLs and the structure of mass
tort litigation. We need not take sides in ongoing debates about federal MDL reform in this forum. It suffices to say that virtually no one
in the mass tort community thinks MDL is perfect.
There is a libertarian argument that a fully functioning market
should do of the work of regulation without many of its costs. Similarly, a “mass-tort libertarian” might insist that the presence of a robust market for consolidated proceeding—i.e., a mix of federal and
state MDLs—should obviate the need for any reform of the MDL
process. Or, to return to our federalism analogy, a form of Tieboutian
sorting should allow dissatisfied litigants to exit the federal MDL for a
system that is more precisely tailored to their needs.153
We reject such market orthodoxy. Markets and regulation are not
perfect substitutes, and it often takes a fine-grained contextual analysis to identify–let alone, resolve–the tradeoffs that they present. Even
if state MDLs achieve all of the promise and avoid all of the pitfalls
we identify above, the presence of state MDLs should not be an excuse to cover one’s eyes to the problems that may arise in mass tort
litigation. Some problems are simply better addressed at the federal
level.
But state MDLs do considerably complicate the picture of nationwide mass tort litigation. The federal MDL is not a black hole that
sucks all related litigation into its vortex. State MDLs allow partially
independent and potentially competing litigations to develop in the
152. See generally Roger Michalski, MDL Immunity: Lessons from the National Prescription
Opiate Litigation, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 175 (2019) (arguing for an exemption from MDL consolidation for cases brought by or against public litigants).
153. See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1956).
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states. And while they do not displace the federal MDL judge or federal lead lawyers at the center of the mass tort universe, the gravitational effects of satellite state MDLs should not be ignored.

